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CONTRACTING OUT OF ARTICLE 2 USING A
"LICENSE" LABEL: A STRATEGY THAT
SHOULD NOT WORK FOR SOFTWARE
PRODUCTS
Jean Braucher*
I. INTRODUCTION
Legal classification of contracts for software products remains
unnecessarily controversial nearly thirty years after the earliest
articles on the topic.' When the question is whether to apply Article
2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), 2 there are two legal
issues: whether the transaction is a sale, and whether the subject
matter is goods? Because treating software products as goods is the
easier issue,4 a useful way to think about the overall question is
whether it should be possible to contract out of Article 2 by using a
label, that is, by calling the transaction a "license."5 The overarching
* Roger Henderson Professor of Law, James E. Rogers College of Law, University of
Arizona.
1. For some of the early articles, see Susan Nycum, Liability for Malfunction of a
Computer Program, 7 RUTGERS J. OF COMPUTER TECH. & LAW 1 (1979) (surveying different
approaches to liability for errors in computer programs); Andrew Rodau, Computer Software:
Does Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code Apply?, 35 EMORY L.J. 853 (1986) (concluding
that Article 2 should apply to software contracts for policy reasons); Bonna Lynn Horovitz, Note,
Computer Software as a Good Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Taking a Byte Out of the
Intangibility Myth, 65 B.U. L. REV. 129 (1985) (dismissing supposed intangibility of software as
a reason to exclude software transactions from Article 2); Note, Computer Programs as Goods
Under the UC.C, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1149 (1979) (arguing that sales of computer programs fall
within Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)).
2. U.C.C. Official Text Art. 2 (2000) (amended 2003). The UCC's sponsors approved
proposed amendments to Article 2's Official Text in 2003 but no state has enacted them.
3. U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (2000) (amended 2003) (defining "sale"); id. § 2-105(1) (defining
"goods"). Although Article 2's scope provision, section 2-102, provides that it applies to
"transactions in goods," most of its provisions apply to buyers or sellers and thus seem to require
a sale. Id. § 2-102; id. § 2-103(1)(a), § 2-103(l)(d) (defining "buyer" and "seller").
4. See infra Part 111.
5. As will be explained, the best classification of software contracts, both for federal and
state law purposes, often may be as both sales of copies and licenses of their use. See infra Parts
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policy question is whether Article 2, for the issues it addresses,
works reasonably well for contracts in software products and should
continue to apply.6 The main argument of this article is that it does
work and therefore should apply.
This is not to say that Article 2 answers all the legal issues about
software transactions or even software products. Much of the
continuing controversy about legal classification of deals in software
is caused by intellectual property implications. Clearly, Article 2
does not address issues in conventional intellectual property
licensing transactions that give permission to make copies of a
copyrighted work for distribution. For transactions involving deliv-
ery of software products to customers, however, Article 2 works well
for the issues it covers but does not address others. In particular, it
does not address whether, for federal intellectual property purposes,
end-use customers become owners of copies of software products,
with first sale rights to sell those copies as well as rights to copy as
necessary for use and archiving.7 That Article 2 does not answer
these federal questions does not suggest, however, that it should not
be used on the issues it does address, including contract formation,
quality warranties, and damage remedies.
The focus of this article is on the desirability of applying Article
2 to transactions in software products. Furthermore, it attempts to
clear away a major distraction, the federal intellectual property law
implications of the sale/license distinction.
The controversy about applying Article 2 to software products
should not be overstated. Most courts have done so.' Even custom
software is increasingly treated as governed by the UCC; as Judge
Richard Posner put it, referring to a U.S. District Court case applying
Article 2 to a license of custom software,9
[A]s Colonial Life is consistent with the weight of authority
IV and V.
6. See infra notes 8-11 and accompanying text (concerning the emerging consensus in the
courts of treating contracts in software products as Article 2 transactions).
7. See infra Part IV (discussing classification for federal intellectual property purposes).
8. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 19 reporter's note on cmt. d
(1998) (collecting case law and concluding that mass-marketed software is goods under the UCC
while software developed for the customer is services).
9. Colonial Life Ins. Co. v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 817 F. Supp. 235, 237-39
(D.N.H. 1993) (applying Article 2 to a license of customized software and data processing
services because "[t]he essence of the contract was to license.., a computer software product").
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• . . and reaches the right result-for we can think of no
reason why the UCC is not suitable to govern disputes
arising from the sale of custom software-we'll follow it.'"
Despite this emerging consensus in the courts,"1 the sponsors of the
Uniform Commercial Code have proposed to roil the waters by
excluding undefined "information" from the scope of Article 2.12
They also propose to add a comment indicating both that application
of Article 2 by analogy should still be considered for all software and
that some software, such as that in cars, should be directly within
Article 2."3 Since the sponsors have nothing clarifying to say, they
would be wiser to remain silent. Better yet, they should put
transactions in software products clearly within the scope of Article
2, codifying the usual judicial approach. They might then turn their
energy and expertise to articulating legal rules to address the issues
in software product transactions on which Article 2 is silent.
Eventually, it would be desirable to have a statute stating default use
and transfer rights as well as setting limits on use and transfer
restrictions in contracts for software products, but it is unnecessary to
disturb or tinker with Article 2 to do this.
To facilitate analysis, Part II below gives an example, clearly
involving goods, of trying to reclassify a sale by using a license
label. Part III addresses the relatively easy issue whether software
products meet the definition of goods under Article 2, concluding
that they do. Part IV discusses the central intellectual property
implications of the classification question, and Part V develops the
argument that software product transactions, even if labeled
"licenses," should be treated as sales for purposes of applying Article
10. Micro Data Base Systems, Inc. v. Dharma Systems, Inc., 148 F.3d 649, 651-54 (7th Cir.
1998) (applying Article 2 to a transaction in customized software under an agreement involving a
"license fee").
11. For other recent cases applying Article 2 to software, see Wachter Management Co. v.
Dexter & Chaney, Inc., 282 Kan. 365, 366368-69, 114 P.3d 747 (2006) (in which the Kansas
Supreme Court applied Article 2 to licensed software in a transaction also involving maintenance,
training, and consulting services); Youngtech, Inc. v. Beijing Book Co., 2006 WL 3903976 (N.J.
Super. A.D. 2006) (unpublished opinion treating customized software as covered by Article 2
even though services were involved); Newcourt Financial USA, Inc. v. FT Mortgage Companies,
Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 894, 897 (N.D. I11. 2001) (noting that custom software is goods under the
UCC, in a case involving licensed custom software and support for that software).
12. U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(k) (2003).
13. See id. § 2-103 cmt. 7; see infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text for additional
discussion of this comment.
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2. This approach is functional; Article 2 should apply to trans-
actions in software products because-for the issues it addresses-it
works, well enough if not perfectly (and as well as Article 2 works
for other products). Also, because many transactions involve
hardware as well as software, application of Article 2 to both types
of component has the advantage of being an elegantly simple
solution to the classification question. While Article 2 does not
answer all questions for either hardware or software, it does address
state law issues these types of goods have in common.
II. "LICENSING" GOODS: AN EXAMPLE
Suppose that car dealers started "licensing" cars to customers
using contracts headed, "End-User License Agreement" (EULA).
Suppose further that dealers used the license label as the basis for a
legal argument that these transactions are outside the scope of Article
2 because they are not sales. 4  The judicial response would
predictably be negative. Courts would likely come to the following
conclusions: If a car dealer wants to disclaim implied warranties, 5
it must do so according to the procedures set forth in Article 2.16
Furthermore, a dealer must supply material terms before making a
contract to avoid the risk that they will not be treated as part of the
deal. In addition, if a dealer delivers a car that fails in any respect
14. See U.C.C. § 2-102 (2000) (amended 2003); see also supra note 3 (concerning the
language of this section). If the contract is for a period less than the useful life of the car, it might
best be classified as a lease under UCC Article 2A. U.C.C. § 2A (2000) (amended 2003). A
license either of unlimited duration or for the useful life of the car raises the issue whether to
classify the transaction as a sale under Article 2. See id. § 2-106(1) (2000) (amended 2003).
15. Id. §§ 2-314 to 2-315 (2000) (amended 2003).
16. See id. §§ 2-316(2)-(3) (setting forth ways to disclaim implied warranties). Another
issue is the scope of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (1975) [hereinafter Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act], which applies to
written warranties in connection with sales of consumer products and should apply to software
products marketed to consumers.
17. See U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (2000) (amended 2003) (providing that even between merchants
any material alteration in delayed terms does not become automatically part of the deal); id. § 2-
207 cmt. 3 (stating that additional and different terms that are material additions come into the
deal only if "expressly agreed to by the other party"); see also Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F.
Supp. 2d 1332, 1339 (D. Kan. 2000) (correcting technical error in analysis in ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996), which stated that UCC Section 2-207 does not
apply to single-form transactions, even though Section 2-207 contains no language which
indicates it only applies to "battles of forms" situations); Jean Braucher, Delayed Disclosure in
Consumer E-Commerce as an Unfair and Deceptive Practice, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1805, 1821
(2000) (arguing that "[n]othing in the language of Section 2-207 supports the idea that its reach is
limited to exchanges of forms-it is not limited to two-form transactions or even to forms at all").
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to conform to the contract, the customer has a right to reject."
Now suppose that the EULA used by car dealers contained some
interesting terms limiting use and transfer, stating:
This car is licensed for personal use. You are the only one
who may operate it. You may not use it for business
purposes. You may not have more than three passengers in
the car at any time. You may not comment on or criticize
the car. You may not open the hood to see how the engine
works or for any other reason. You may not try to repair
the car; only authorized dealers may repair the car. You
may not sell the car. If you no longer want the car, you
must have it compacted or return it to the dealer.
The addition of these "license" terms fails to improve the legal
argument that Article 2 does not apply. The transaction should be
classified as a sale of a car, governed by Article 2 on the questions
that law addresses.
Of course, the enforceability of the use and transfer restrictions
is debatable. Article 2 does not address these issues, except perhaps
by means of the unconscionability section.' 9 The prohibition on
opening the hood might violate the federal intellectual property law
protection for reverse engineering.20  The requirement that only
authorized dealers may make repairs might also violate federal
antitrust law as well as intellectual property law.2 The prohibitions
against having more than three passengers, commenting on or
criticizing the car, or selling it might be against public policy under
state law.2 All these issues, however, are distractions from the
question whether Article 2 applies to software products. Although
Article 2 itself will not necessarily provide answers on these issues, it
should still apply to those questions that it does address.
18. U.C.C. § 2-601 (2000) (amended 2003) (providing for the right to reject tendered goods
that "fail in any respect to conform to the contract").
19. U.C.C. § 2-302 (2000) (amended 2003).
20. Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse
Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1584 (2002) (citing Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent
Scope of Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REv. 1, 6 (2001)) (concerning rights of
buyers of patented machines under the first sale principle of patent law to disassemble them to
study how they work).
21. See id. at 1582-85 (concerning right of disassembly and study); Sherman Antitrust Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1890) (amended 1990).
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 186(1) (1981) (discussing
unenforceability on grounds of public policy of promises that restrain trade).
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While eventually it would be a good idea to have a federal or
state statute that explicitly addresses the enforceability of use and
transfer restrictions used commonly in software transactions,23 courts
must use available law in the meantime. But when it comes to issues
such as warranties, disclaimers of warranties, contract formation and
what terms become part of the contract, buyer's remedies for
defective delivery or breach of warranty, and seller's remedies for
refusal to take delivery, Article 2 works and should govern.24 Even if
a court were to conclude that Article 2 does not apply directly to a
license, it should apply by analogy for these issues.25
The car license example could be complicated by having the
manufacturer of the car provide the EULA, with the dealer passing it
through to end-use customers. The dealer might have a very simple
contract stating, "This car is licensed by the manufacturer." The
manufacturer's license might be disclosed as follows: The first time
the customer gets in the car to drive it, the EULA might appear on
the dashboard screen and require a touch "to agree," plus entry of the
customer's name or code, before the car could be driven. Under this
variation, Article 2 still should apply, at least to the transaction
between the dealer and the end-use car customer. If the dealer did
not exclude or modify implied warranties according to the
requirements of Article 2,26 the dealer would be liable for them.27 As
23. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, The Failed Promise of the UCITA Mass-Market Concept and
Its Lessons for Policing of Standard Form Contracts, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 393, 421-
23 (2003) [hereinafter Braucher, Mass-Market Concept] (concerning the desirability of having
statutory bars to enforcement of mass-market terms prohibiting transfer to the same type of user,
comment and criticism, and fair-use reverse engineering).
24. See Radau, supra note 1, at 857, 859 (discussing advantages of applying Article 2 to
software, including avoiding formalism and the nonuniformity that comes from applying the
common law). See also U.C.C. § 1-102, cmt. 1 (2000) (amended 2003) ("This Act is drawn to
provide flexibility so that, since it is intended to be a semi-permanent piece of legislation, it will
provide its own machinery for expansion of commercial practices. It is intended to make it
possible for the law embodied in this Act to be developed by the courts in light of unforeseen and
new circumstances and practices."); see also U.C.C. § 1-103 cmt. 1 (2003) (containing similar
language).
25. See U.C.C. § 1-102, cmt. 1 (2000) (amended 2003) ("Courts ... have recognized the
policies embodied in an act as applicable in reason to subject-matter which was not expressly
included in the language of the act . . . They have done the same where reason and policy so
required, even where the subject-matter had been intentionally excluded from the act in general..
. . Nothing in this Act stands in the way of the continuance of such action by the courts."); see
also U.C.C. § 1-103 cmt. 1 (2003) (containing similar language).
26. See U.C.C. § 2-316(2)-(3) (2000) (amended 2003). A manufacturer who gave a written
warranty could not, under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, supra note 16, exclude the implied
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with car sales (as opposed to the car "license" involved here), the
question whether the manufacturer's warranties to the ultimate
customer are governed by Article 2 would be in some doubt.28  At
any rate, whether under Article 2 or the common law of contract,
EULA terms presented after delivery of the car, and attempting to
take away rights to transfer the car and to use it in certain ways,
should not become part of the deal.29
Another possible variation is that some or all of the software in
the car might come with a "license," rather than the entire car being
licensed. Again, if Article 2 issues (such as agreement to terms,
warranties, remedies) arise, then Article 2 should apply.
III. SOFTWARE COPIES As GOODS UNDER ARTICLE 2 OF THE UCC
Obviously, the car licensing examples above are based on
current practices of software producers. The use of cars instead of
software copies in the examples helps us to see that the license label
is used for strategic legal purposes and does not describe some
necessary objective reality. In addition, using cars avoids the issue
whether the transaction is in "goods."3 However, this is an issue that
needs to be addressed when the transaction is in a copy of a software
product, although it is not particularly difficult.
Goods are defined in Article 2 as "all things ... movable."'" In
warranty of merchantability, but it could limit its duration to the duration of an express warranty.
15 U.S.C. § 2308(a)-(b) (1975).
27. U.C.C. § 2-314 (applying an implied warranty of merchantability to all Article 2 sales
made by merchants unless excluded or modified); id. § 2-315 (applying an implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose to certain Article 2 sales unless excluded or modified); id. § 2-711
(detailing a buyer's remedies for "rightfully reject[ing]" non-conforming goods); id. § 2-714
(detailing a buyer's remedies for "any non-conforming of tender" after "the buyer has accepted
[the] goods").
28. To address this problem, Amended Article 2 would make manufacturers liable to remote
purchasers for obligations undertaken in pass-through warranties. U.C.C. § 2-313A (2003).
29. See U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (2000) (amended in 2003). In this example, the manufacturer is
attempting to contract directly with the end-user using the car's dashboard screen, eliminating the
issue of privity, so that Article 2 § 2-207 should apply directly. Courts often apply Article 2 to
manufacturers' warranties even when there is no privity. See Braucher, supra note 17, at 1824-
26. In the hard goods context, manufacturers' terms usually add rights rather than take them
away. Id. There is even more reason to require advance disclosure where the manufacturer wants
to take away transfer and use rights.
30. A car most definitely is a thing moveable at the time of contracting. See U.C.C. § 2-
105(1) (2000) (amended 2003) (defining goods).
31. See id.
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all but three states, 3 2 this is the key operative statutory language
concerning whether software products are goods under Article 2.
"Thing" is a word of studied imprecision.3 Moreover, while the
modifier "movable" excludes real estate, it is debatable what sort of
movability is covered." Even if tangibility is required for a product
to be a movable thing (which is not necessarily the case), this hurdle
is easily topped.35 Software copies better be tangible material objects
or making unauthorized copies would not be prohibited by copyright
law: the Copyright Act defines copies as "material objects ... from
which the work can be perceived ... either directly or with the aid of
a machine ... " 36 Digital software copies are machine-readable and
thus material objects for purposes of the Copyright Act.37 There is
no good reason not to extend this version of tangibility, assuming
tangibility is necessary, to the realm of Article 2. Software copies
are perceivable by a machine and in that sense tangible, making them
easily "things," which may not require tangibility. Software copies
can be moved in various ways, including on computers and disks and
by electronic download.
Furthermore, software copies are distributed as products, like
hard goods, or as parts of products that combine software and
hardware. Of course some end-use software contracts also include
services, such as technical assistance, but this is also true of other
types of goods. When both goods and services are involved in one
contract, courts face the difficult issue of what law to apply to a
mixed transaction, an issue not peculiar to software contracts.3" As
already noted, proposed amendments to Article 2 would exclude
32. See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
33. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1226 (Frederick C. Mish ed.,
Merriam-Webster Inc. 9th ed. 1988) (defining "thing" variously, including as "an object or entity
not precisely designated or capable of being designated").
34. An example where this issue arises is coverage of electricity. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 19 cmt. d (1998).
35. Rodau, supra note 1, at 862.
36. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
37. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding
that even loading software into random access memory (RAM) creates a copy under the
Copyright Act); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 260 (5th Cir. 1988)
("Loading a program... into a computer's memory creates a copy of the program.").
38. See U.C.C. § 2-102 (2000) (amended 2003) (providing that Article 2 applies to
"transactions in goods" but not expressly addressing what to do about mixed transactions in
goods and services); see also Rodau, supra note 1, at 863.
268
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undefined "information" from the definition of goods.39  The
uncertainty of what this exclusion means, if anything, is one of the
key reasons the proposed amendments package has not been enacted
by any jurisdiction.4" If information means intangible data, the
exclusion adds nothing. No one thinks the sale of the recipe for Coca
Cola would be a sale of goods.
The software customer coalition as well as software producers
have all opposed the proposed exclusion of information because of
its failure to clarify the law.4 Proposed Comment 7 would only add
to the confusion. 2  It states that Article 2, if amended, would "not
directly apply to an electronic transfer of information" and cites a
case that involved a free download, which is not within Article 2 in
any event because no price was charged." The use of the phrase
"directly apply" flags that application by analogy is still possible.
The comment also states that "the sale of 'smart goods' such as an
automobile is a transaction in goods fully within this article even
though the automobile contains many computer programs."44  The
comment thus raises more questions than it answers. Does it matter
if the software in a car is "licensed" rather than sold? What if new
software is downloaded to the car by the dealer as part of repairs?
Would that software be excluded because it was electronically
transferred? What is the defensible distinction between downloaded
and preloaded software? And what of software preloaded on a
39. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text (concerning U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(k) (2003)).
40. The amendments have been introduced in Nevada, Kansas, and Oklahoma but have not
been enacted. S.B. 200, 73d Leg. Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2005), available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us
/73rd/bills/SB/SB200.pdf; H.B. 2454, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2005), available at
http://kslegislature.org/bills/2006/2454.pdf, H.B. 3129, 50th Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2006),
available at http://webserverl.lsb.state.ok.us/2005-O6HB/HB3129_int.rtf). See also infra notes
46-48 (concerning stealth changes made in Article 2 in Oklahoma). A portion of Amended
Article 2 and a few sections of Amended Article 2A were introduced in Oklahoma in 2007 as
H.B. 2172; this bill was reported out of committee but remained in limbo as of mid-March 2007.
41. Americans for Fair Electronic Commerce Transactions (AFFECT), Proposed UCITA-
related Legislation, http://ucita.comlegislation.htm#two (providing reasons for opposition to
proposed Amended Article 2 by Americans for Fair Electronic Commerce Transactions, a
coalition of software customers including consumers, libraries and businesses) (last visited Feb.
24, 2007); Quentin Riegel, National Association of Manufacturers' Letter Stating Position on
Proposed Amended Article 2, http://nam.org/s..nam/sec.asp?CID=107&DID=105 (also providing
list of "key documents" stating reasons for opposition) (last visited Feb. 24, 2007).
42. See U.C.C. § 2-103 cmt. 7 (2003).
43. Id. (citing Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2001),
aff'd, 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002)). The definition of "sale" in U.C.C. § 2-106(1) requires a price.
44. U.C.C. § 2-103, cmt. 7 (2003).
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computer, the most common form of software distribution? Is that
like the car example, still directly within Article 2 because the
software is delivered loaded on the hardware? And why worry about
whether software copies are in or out of Article 2 if ultimately the
courts are invited to and likely will apply Article 2 by analogy if it
does not apply directly? "
Oklahoma is the only state to jump into this briar patch. In a
stealth action primarily dealing with Revised Article 1, Oklahoma
enacted the exclusion of "information" from the definition of goods
under Article 2, although it has not otherwise enacted the proposed
Article 2 amendments.46 In the same stealth maneuver, Oklahoma
also excluded "a license of information" from the definition of a
"contract for sale,"47 a non-uniform amendment not part of the
proposed Article 2 amendments approved by the UCC's sponsors.48
Because "information" is undefined and may only refer to intangible
data as opposed to machine-readable products, it is not clear that the
exclusion of "a license of information" has the effect of excluding
software products from the coverage of Article 2 in Oklahoma.
Two other states, Virginia and Maryland, have enacted the
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) and thus
have addressed this issue.49 Transactions in software products are
covered by that statute in those states. Interestingly, UCITA is based
in significant part on Article 2 and thus demonstrates the
fundamental workability of Article 2 for software contracts."
45. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (concerning application of the UCC by
analogy).
46. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-105(1) (2004) (excluding undefined "information" from the
definition of goods). This change was included in a 2005 bill to enact Revised Article 1. H.B.
2028, 50th Leg. 1st Reg. Sess. at 589 (Okla. 2005). The description of the bill's purpose
concerning this change states only "amending 12A O.S. 2001, Sections 2-103, 2-105, 2-106 and
2-202, which relate to sales ...." Id. at 574.
47. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-106(1) (providing that a contract of sale "does not include a
license of information"); H.B. 2028, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. at 590 (Okla. 2005).
48. See U.C.C. § 2-106 (2003).
49. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-501.1 to -509.2 (2005), available at http://legl.state.va.us/cgi-
bin/legp504.exe?000+cod+59.1-501.1; MD. CODE ANN., COMM. LAW §§ 22-101 to -816
(LexisNexis 2005).
50. See Prefatory Note, Official Text, Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
(2002), available at http://www.law.upenn.eduIbll/ulc/ucita/2002fmal.htm (last visited Feb. 24,
2007) [hereinafter UCITA Official Text] (noting that Article 2 served as a model in part and point
of departure for drafting UCITA). Jean Braucher, New Basics: Twelve Principles for Fair
Commerce in Mass-Market Software and Other Digital Products in Jane K. Winn, ed.,
CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE 'INFORMATION ECONOMY 179-81 (2006)
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However, UCITA tweaks the rules on a number of issues to give
more favorable treatment to software producers. 1  Other sellers
would no doubt be happy to get the same favorable treatment. The
differences between Article 2 and UCITA on issues they both cover
have little to do with differences in their subject matter and
everything to do with the influence of the software industry on the
UCITA drafting process. 2
IV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IMPLICATIONS
OF CLASSIFICATION OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS
The software industry's use of EULAs is only secondarily
driven by a desire to escape from Article 2. The main reason for
licensing is to try to limit the rights that customers get under
intellectual property law when they are deemed owners of copies. 3
Under the Copyright Act, copy owners get first sale rights to sell
their copies." Also, copy owners of computer programs get rights to
make another copy "as an essential step in the utilization of the
computer program in conjunction with a machine.., or... for
archival purposes."55 Federal law does not define a sale for purposes
of these rights, and the courts have tended to use state law to answer
the issue of transaction type for purposes of applying the provisions
on copy owners' rights.56 This reliance on state law is conceptually
problematic: there is no reason to believe Congress meant to delegate
to the states the right to define who gets first-sale rights or rights to
[hereinafter Braucher, New Basics] (noting the common history of UCITA, originally conceived
as Article 2B of the UCC, in the revision of Article 2). After the American Law Institute pulled
out of the project because of dissatisfaction with its technical quality and substantive choices, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws decided to proceed with it as a
freestanding uniform law. See id. at 181.
51. See infra notes 105-110 and accompanying text.
52. Braucher, New Basics, supra note 50, at 181-82 (summarizing the history of UCITA and
discussing its bias toward software producers and against customers).
53. See Christian H. Nadan, Software Licensing in the 21st Century: Are Software
"Licenses" Really Sales, and How Will the Software Industry Respond? 32 AIPLA Q.J. 555,
559-69 (2004) (discussing objective of escaping from the first sale doctrine).
54. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006) (the owner of a particular copy is entitled without the
authority of the copyright owner to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy).
55. Id. § 117(a)(1)-(2).
56. Lothar Determann & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Don't Judge a Sale by Its License:
Software Transfers Under the First Sale Doctrine in the United States and the European
Community, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 29 (2001) (discussing the application of UCC interpretations of
the meaning of "sale" when analyzing the question of copy ownership).
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copy further. 7 Whether a customer acquires ownership of a copy for
copyright purposes should be resolved under federal law in light of
federal policies.
Some restrictions on transfer and use of software products are
defensible. There are good policy arguments for facilitating price
differentiation in the marketing of software products. For example,
sellers may charge higher prices for business purposes or for more
users while charging lower prices for consumer purposes and fewer
users. 8 This value-based pricing means more customers will access
the product and producers can reap more profits from their
investments in developing software products. 9 To protect price
differentiation, it may be necessary to enforce transfer and use
restrictions so that customers cannot acquire for one purpose and
then use for another higher-priced purpose; customers also should
not be able to acquire for one purpose and then transfer to someone
in a higher-priced category.6" It would be desirable to have some
form of digital first-sale rights that define what sorts of restrictions
on transfer and use should be permissible. End-use customers might
be seen as buyers of copies, who get basic transfer and use rights,
and, to the extent that they enter into contracts to get greater rights,
licensees of those copies as well. Working out the details of a
reasonable set of basic digital first-sale rights is beyond the scope of
this article.
A difficult issue is what level of remedy, an action for
infringement or an action for breach of contract, is needed to
facilitate price differentiation.6  For example, if licensees are
"owners" of copies for first sale purposes, they and their transferees
would not be infringers if use restrictions were exceeded, assuming
57. Id. at 58-56.
58. See Jean Braucher, When Your Refrigerator Orders Groceries Online and Your Car
Dials 911 After an Accident: Do We Really Need New Law for the World of Smart Goods? 8
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 241, 253-54 (2002) [hereinafter Braucher, Smart Goods] (discussing
arguments for price differentiation); see also Michael J. Meurer, Price Discrimination, Personal
Use and Piracy: Copyright Protection of Digital Works, 45 BUFF. L. REv. 845, 848-49 (1997)
(arguing that increasing protections for digital works will facilitate price discrimination, but
increased protections are not required to protect copyright holders' profits).
59. Braucher, Smart Goods, supra note 58, at 254 (explaining the effect of value-based
pricing).
60. See id.
61. See Nadan, supra note 53, at 576-77 (discussing limits of contractual transfer and use
restrictions).
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they did not exceed Copyright Act rights to copy,62 but they could be
contract breachers, subject to liability for damages. 63 The transaction
could be both a sale and license, in which the customer becomes
owner of a copy with certain contractual use rights. Under this
approach, the customer would be both an owner and a licensee. As
owners, customers could sell their copies, 64 but as licensees they
would breach their contracts if they sold to someone who made use
of the product for a higher-valued use not permitted under the
license. Owners of copies have rights to make an additional copy for
essential use, 65 but if they wished to make multiple copies for use on
different machines or through a network, they would need a license
to do so. Again, in this analysis they would be both owners and
licensees. The alternative analysis is that they have no rights to
transfer or to copy other than rights expressly given by a license, and
therefore they and their transferees would be infringers if they
exceeded the license. This is probably overkill, making concep-
tualizing the transaction as both a sale of a copy and a license of its
use a better approach.
Accommodation of price discrimination by recognition of the
legitimacy of some transfer and use restrictions should not lead to an
"anything goes" approach to contractual transfer and use restrictions
because some restrictions are anti-competitive.66 They could be
barred by federal law or by state law refusing to enforce contract
terms against public policy.67 A blanket restriction on all transfers is
anti-competitive because it can eliminate the beneficial effects of
competition from used products.68 Contractual restrictions on fair
62. See id. at 579-81 (discussing how additional license restrictions on software use bind
subsequent users in ways first sale doctrine does not).
63. The original customer would be in breach if it made an unpermitted transfer; the
transferee might be in breach if the original customer required an agreement to the license that the
transferee then breached. Owners have rights of transfer and limited copying. 17 U.S.C. §§ 109,
117(a)(1) (2006). To exceed the copying permitted to owners of copies, they would need a
license from the original seller. See Nadan, supra note 53, at 578.
64. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2006).
65. Id. § 117(a)(1).
66. Braucher, Smart Goods, supra note 58, at 254-57 (discussing the need for limits on
contractual restriction of transfer and use).
67. Id. at 254-55.
68. Id. at 255-56. See also Nadan, supra note 53, at 573 (discussing eliminating the
availability of used software as a benefit, from the producer's perspective, of avoiding the first
sale doctrine using license restrictions).
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uses 69 such as criticism and comment are also anti-competitive,
keeping important information out of the marketplace.70 Sweeping
restrictions on reverse engineering are also questionable if they have
the anti-competitive effect of preventing repair by a customer or third
party or adjustment of products to a customer's needs or develop-
ment of interoperable competing products.7" Increasingly, fair uses
are cut off as a practical matter by digital rights management
technology, which cannot be legally circumvented .
The American Law Institute's project on Principles of the Law
of Software Contracts73 suggests there are currently three possible
ways to police unreasonable transfer and use restrictions. First, they
might be pre-empted by federal law.74 Second and third, they also
might be against public policy or unconscionable under state law.75
A fourth possibility is that state public policy judgments could be
made by state statutes, making certain types of terms unenforceable
in general, or unenforceable in mass-market transactions; state
statutes also could provide minimum transfer and use rights and
provide contract remedies, such as rejection or damages for failure to
provide them.76
In sum, federal law on transfer and use rights and restrictions is
not well developed. Meanwhile, state law should not feel burdened to
solve problems of federal law by classifying transactions in state law
so as to try to produce particular federal law results. State law
should address problems within its scope and leave it to Congress to
clarify, if necessary, who has first sale rights. To the extent that
federal law leaves issues to contract law, states, of course, can use
69. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (describing "fair uses" as also including "news reporting,
teaching... scholarship, or research").
70. See Braucher, Smart Goods, supra note 58, at 254.
71. See Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 20, at 1613-20 (discussing reverse engineering
of software for interoperability purposes).
72. See Timothy K. Armstrong, Digital Rights Management and the Process of Fair Use, 20
HARV. J. L. & TECH. 49 (2006) (noting this problem and investigating the possibility that new
generations of DRM technology might better protect fair use).
73. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS
(Council Draft No. 1 Nov. 7, 2006).
74. See id. at § 1.09.
75. See id. at§§ 1.10, 1.11.
76. See Braucher, Mass-Market Concept, supra note 23, at 421-23 (discussing desirability
of targeted regulation of abusive terms in mass-market software contracts); Braucher, New
Basics, supra note 50, at 194-95 (noting desirability of using specific legislation to police
unfairness rather than vague doctrines such as unconscionability).
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their traditional contract policing powers under the common law or
statutes. 7 States could create mandatory or default rules to protect
reasonable customer expectations concerning use and transfer of
software products. For example, if federal law does not provide any
use rights to a customer who "licenses" software, state law might
provide a minimum implied license because it would be contrary to
reasonable expectations for a customer to pay for a product and not
be able to use it.
V. SOFTWARE PRODUCT CONTRACTS
AS "SALES" FOR ARTICLE 2 PURPOSES
Commercial law typically takes a functional approach to
classification. Broadly, this means that classification is made with an
eye to whether it produces good results.7 ' Furthermore, parties
cannot contract out of mandatory rules by relabeling a transaction
with a new legal name.79 Sellers cannot call their deals licenses and
escape mandatory obligations of good faith and fair dealing" or
procedural requirements such as advance disclosure of material terms
and disclaimer of warranties in particular ways.s"
Article 2 defines a sale in terms of the passing of title for a
price, 2 but the reference to title is not meant to impose a formal,
non-functional approach.83 Article 2 recognizes that reservation of
title is a legal strategy that should be limited in its effect.8 4 A title-
77. See Braucher, Smart Goods, supra note 58, at 245.
78. See supra note 25 (concerning application of the UCC by analogy when a case outside
its scope fits within the reason of a rule). This is pure Karl Llewellyn. See KARL LLEWELLYN,
THE BRAMBLE BUSH 157-58 (1951) (describing the "Grand Tradition" of judging based on "the
double maxim: the rule follows where its reason leads; where the reason stops, there stops the
rule").
79. An example is calling a transaction a "lease" when it is really a secured sale and thus
should be subject to Article 9. See U.C.C. § 1-203(a) (2003) ("whether a transaction in the form
of a lease creates a lease or security interest is determined by the facts of each case"); see also id.
§ 1-201(37) (2000) (amended 2003) (containing the same language as the 2003 version).
80. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (2000) (amended 2003) (defining good faith and fair dealing).
8 1"' Id. §§ 2-207, 2-316.
82. Id. § 2-106. The price element of the definition has the advantage of excluding open
source software that is distributed for free. Article 2, with its implied warranties and damages
liability, does not work well for the open source community. See Braucher, New Basics, supra
note 50, at 190.
83. See U.C.C. § 2-401 cmt. 1 (2000) (amended 2003) (explaining that the article does not
deal with issues between seller and buyer in terms of whether "title" has passed).
84. Id. § 2-401 (providing that any retention or reservation of title by the seller after
shipment or delivery is "limited in effect to a reservation of a security interest").
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retention strategy that had been attempted at the time of Article 2's
enactment was as a way to have goods sold serve as collateral.85
Article 2 limited the effect of such a provision to a security interest. 6
When it comes to the effect of a "license" that reserves title to the
"licensor," the real question is how to address transfer and use
restrictions. A solution is to treat end-use software contracts for
software products as both sales under Article 2 and licenses to the
extent the contracts set enforceable limits on transfer and use. 7
Article 2 provides some gloss on transfer restrictions, providing
that a buyer may assign all rights unless otherwise agreed.88 Federal
pre-emption and policing based on public policy and
unconscionability may set limits on contractual transfer restrictions.89
Policing for anti-competitive effects, for example of a complete bar
on any transfer of a product, can be done under the doctrine of
refusal to enforce terms against public policy.9 ° The common law
supplements the UCC on issues where it is silent.91  Similarly,
contractual use restrictions should be permissible except if pre-
empted, contrary to public policy, or unconscionable.92 As indicated
above, new state statutes could be an even better way to set public
policy limits on contractual transfer and use restrictions,93 issues that
Article 2 does not address except under the heading of
unconscionability.
The key point in a functional approach is that Article 2
addresses well many issues that arise in contracts for software
products. Article 2 has a flexible approach to contract formation 94
but sets limits on delayed terms.95 It provides rules for the creation
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text (discussing possibility of this approach
under Copyright Act as well).
88. U.C.C. § 2-210(2) (2000) (amended 2003) (providing that the rights of buyers and sellers
can be assigned).
89. See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
90. See id. and supra note 22.
91. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (2000); U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (2003).
92. See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
94. See U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (2000) (amended 2003) (making "any manner sufficient to show
agreement" the standard for contract formation).
95. Id. § 2-207.
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of express warranties96 and provides implied warranties97 that can be
disclaimed and modified.98 It also provides rules for tender of
delivery and tender of payment.99 Its remedy scheme provides for
exit from transactions when there is a failure to deliver conforming
goods,'00 and it provides sellers and buyers with remedies for non-
performance and defective performance. ° ' If Article 2 did not exist,
courts would have to use the common law to fashion rules to govern
all these topics. It is no surprise that the courts have turned to Article
2 because it supplies ready-made, workable answers to these
common questions. 102
On some of these issues, UCITA provides different answers,
applicable only in Maryland and Virginia.' °3 Other states have
declined to accept UCITA's more producer-friendly answers, which
are a result of capture of the UCITA drafting process by the software
industry."° UCITA seems to sanction delayed terms, even in online
mass-market settings where advance availability is easy to achieve.0 5
It also makes it harder for buyers to exit for nonconforming tender, 6
and it reduces the content of the basic implied warranty quality
standard.'0 7 Notably, in the process, it recognizes the need for
answers to the same issues addressed in Article 2.18 UCITA also
takes some unreasonable, unbalanced positions on transfer and use
rights. It seems to give customers no use rights if the producer does
not expressly grant them. 9 It also permits unreasonable contractual
96. Id. § 2-313 (concerning express warranties).
97. Id. §§ 2-314, 2-315 (concerning implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a
particular purpose).
98. Id. § 2-316 (providing for exclusion and modification of warranties).
99. Id. § 2-503 (setting default rules for how and when a seller tenders delivery); id. § 2-507
(generally making a buyer's duty to accept and pay for goods conditional on the seller's tender of
delivery); id. § 2-511 (stating also that "tender of payment is a condition to the seller's duty to
tender and complete any delivery").
100. Id. § 2-601.
101. Id. § 2-703 (listing seller's remedies) and § 2-711 (listing buyer's remedies).
102. See supra notes 8-11.
103. See supra note 49.
104. Braucher, New Basics, supra note 50, at 181-82.
105. See UCITA Official Text, supra note 50, §§ 112, 209.
106. See id. § 601(b)(l)-(2) (setting material breach as the standard to refuse a performance).
107. See id. § 403 (reducing the content of the implied warranty of merchantability by
excluding "pass[ing] without objection in the trade," which is part of UCC section 2-314(2)(a)).
108. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
109. See UCITA Official Text, supra note 50, at § 307.
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limits on transfer rights and on public comment and reverse
engineering.1
A few of the rules in Article 2 are a bit awkward as applied to
software. For example, the risk of loss rules shift the risk to the
buyer in certain circumstances... where, for software, it might make
sense to leave the risk with the seller because making another copy
of software involves minimal cost. Furthermore, the default
warranty of title provision may assume that title questions are more
straightforward than is the case with software copies, with greater
risk of infringement claims, but provisions for variation by
agreement provide leeway to fashion appropriate contract terms.
112
These problems are minor, however, and do not detract from the
overall conclusion that Article 2 works as a framework for contracts
in software products. They are no greater than many of the minor
problems with Article 2 as applied to other goods.11 3 Article 2 is
110. See id. at § 503(2) (in general permitting restrictions on transfer, with a few very limited
exceptions for gift transfers with a computer to a public elementary or secondary school, to a
public library, or from a consumer to a consumer but not for second-hand sales by a consumer to
consumer, even with a computer, or for gifts to any college, even though the transferor does not
keep a copy) and § 105(c) (protecting certain public comment but not other public comment,
specifically comment by anyone other than an end-user and even end-user comments on products
not in final form) and § 118 (protecting only reverse engineering for interoperability of an
independently created computer program when the elements studied were not previously readily
available, but not protecting reverse engineering to fix bugs, customize to a user's needs or to
detect infringement); see also Braucher, New Basics, supra note 50, at 182, and accompanying
notes.
111. U.C.C. §§ 2-509, 2-510 (2000) (amended 2003).
112. Id. § 2-312(1)(a) (providing the buyer with a warranty of good title). But see id. §§ 2-
312(2)-(3) (permitting variation by agreement).
113. For example, the section on express warranties sets a vague "basis of the bargain" test for
affirmations of fact and promises to be treated as express warranties. Id. § 2-3 13. This test
could no doubt be improved upon for all goods, hardware and software alike, to avoid the
undesirable possible interpretation that specific reliance by a particular buyer need be proved
(which is especially undesirable in the mass-market, where buyers pay for express warranties
whether or not they are aware of them). If an amended Article 2 project eventually becomes
politically possible, such issues could be addressed along with some of the minor awkwardness of
Article 2 as applied to software products. See supra notes 111-112 and accompanying text. There
are more major problems with Article 2 as applied to some sorts of transactions, such as
consumer transactions. The lack of specificity of Article 2 on many issues makes it too expensive
for consumers to litigate claims concerning small dollars amounts. See William C. Whitford,
Structuring Consumer Protection Legislation to Maximize Effectiveness, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 1018
(discussing the value of specificity in statutory commands). This is why consumer legislation,
such as the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act, supra note 16, providing for attorneys' fees to be
recoverable when consumers prevail in warranty actions, 15 U.S.C.A. at § 2310(d), is needed as
an overlay on Article 2.
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famously flexible and open-textured, 14 which is how it manages to
cover everything from grain to stock animals to manufactured goods
and now software products.
VI. CONCLUSION
Classification of end-use software contracts as Article 2 sales
makes functional sense. Article 2's provisions on what terms
become part of the contract, on warranties, and on remedies all work
for software product transactions. If Article 2 did not apply, it would
be necessary to make up rules on all these topics. This is not to say
that Article 2 addresses all of the significant issues concerning
contracts for software products. It does not address transfer and use
restrictions. Law reformers should save their energy for addressing
these new, important issues concerning software and leave Article 2
to address the issues that are common to hardware and software.
Furthermore, the issue whether end-use software transactions are
"sales" under Article 2 should not turn on possible implications for
federal intellectual property law, in particular for the first sale
doctrine. It is the job of Congress to clarify federal intellectual
property rights.
114. See Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code,
27 STAN. L.REV. 621 (1975).
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